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A purpose of this paper is to give a critical review of the total allowable catch 
(TAC) policy within the European Union (the EU) for cod in the North Sea. 
The actual TACs are compared with the biological recommendations about the 
TAC and the bio-economic optimal TAC. It is shown that the actual TAC 
follows biological recommendations but that bio-economic principles are 
poorly reflected in the TAC. The Danish regulatory policy for cod in the North 
Sea (rations) is analysed by means of a bio-economic model. It is shown that 
the information requirements needed for conducting a bio-economic optimal 
allocation of rations are considerable. Furthermore, the actual allocation scheme 
for rations distribute too high a share of the EU determined Danish  quota to 
small vessels. Taxes and individual transferable quotas (ITQs) combined with 
bio-economic optimal TACs is presented as an alternative to the existing policy. 
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1.  Introduction 
Within the European Union (the EU) an aspect of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) is that a level of total allowable catches (TACs) are defined for main 
species and are allocated to Member States as quotas. It is then up to the 
Member States to decide which fishermen that are going to harvest the quota. 
This is done by the choice of a management system. This management structure 
is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Management system overview 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to give a critical review of this policy structure for 
cod in the North Sea. Bio-economic optimal TACs will be compared with 
actual TACs and biological recommendations about the TAC, and it will be 
argued that the actual TACs ought to reflect bio-economic criteria’s to a higher 
degree. For this reason an bio-economic critique is given of the Member State 
level in Figure 1 with help from a theoretical model. Demark is used in the 
critique and Denmark uses rations as the management system for cod in the 
North Sea. 
 
Note that the overall TAC in the North Sea is decided in bilateral negotiations 
with Norway. Therefore, the management system outlined in Figure 1 is a 
simplified representation of the actual management system. However, the EU 
Member States catch the main part of cod in the North Sea and for this reason 
the effect that Norway has on the EU TAC is excluded (the EU TAC is taken to 
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The EU TAC and quota policy is part of the conservation policy. However, 
there are four additional elements of the CFP. The first element is the control 
policy, and the purpose of this policy is to secure enforcement of, and 
compliance with, the TAC. An important principle in the control policy is that 
the responsibility for control is placed at the Member State level. The EU role is 
to secure that the enforcement activity does not considerably differ between 
countries. This is done through the use of EU inspectors. An evaluation of the 
control policy is to be found in Jensen (2000). The second element of the CFP 
is the market policy. This policy establishes marketing standards, stabilizes 
market prices, supports producer’s income, and consider consumers interests. 
An important aspect of the market policy is to guide prices based on the average 
prices at first-hand sale. Holden (1996) contains an evaluation of the market 
policy. A third element of the CFP is an external policy. This policy gives the 
Commission competence to negotiate with non-EU countries in order to secure 
access to non-EU waters. An evaluation of the external policy is also t o be 
found in Holden (1996). The last aspect of the CFP is the structural policy. The 
main purpose of this policy is to facilitate structural changes in the fishery 
sector by granting financial aid. An important aspect of the structural policy is 
the multi-annual guidance program, according to which objectives for fleet 
development are decided. Frost  et al (1995) contains an evaluation of the 
structural policy. Even though it would be relevant to evaluate the overall CFP, 
attention is restricted to TAC and quotas in this paper. 
 
A brief description of the history of the EU TAC and quota policy is also 
useful. The first TAC and quotas were set 25 January 1983. The TACs are 
allocated to Member States as quotas and the concept of relative stability plays 
an important role when the TAC is distributed. According to the principle of 
relative stability the Member States receive a fixed share of the TAC each year. 
The allocation scheme of the TACs is based on three factors. Firstly, the 
historical catches in the period 1973-1978. Secondly, special provision is given 
for areas heavily dependent upon fishing (the Hague Preferences). Thirdly, 
compensation is given for losses caused by the extension of fishing limits to 
200 miles by third countries. The allocation scheme for TACs has not changed 
since 1983. In 1992 a new regulation came into existence. The new regulation 
introduced two additional elements. Firstly, the Member States must introduce 
license systems. Secondly, the Council of Ministers may establish multi-annual  
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or multi-species TACs. However, these instruments have not been implemented 
in practice. 
 
In section 2, the actual TAC, the recommended TAC and the economic optimal 
TAC are compared, while section 3 contains an economic critique of ration 
fisheries. Section 4 discusses alternatives to the existing policy and section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.  A comparison of various TACs 
The purpose of this section is to compare actual TACs with bio-economic 
optimal TACs and biological recommendations about the TACs (section 2.3.). 
However, before this is done a brief description of the policy is useful (section 
2.1.) and it is necessary to introduce the various TACs (section 2.2.). 
 
2.1  Brief description of the EU TAC and quota policy 
The EU TAC and quota policy is part of EU´s conservation policy. The 
conservation policy consists of rules for protected areas (Regulation no. 
3782/92), regulation of fishing effort (Regulation no. 685/95) and technical 
protection limits (Regulation no. 850/98) in addition to the TAC and quota 
policy. The conservation policy is the most important part of the CFP. In the 
conservation policy fundamental rules for the allocation of resources between 
Member States are decided (Regulation no. 33760/92). The Member States 
have placed their competence to regulate to the Council of Ministers. In article 
4 in Regulation no. 33760/92 it is stated that the Council of Ministers shall 
conduct EU initiatives that determine the conditions for accessing the resources. 
Article 100 in Regulation no. 33760/92 state that the Member States have 
competence to conduct initiatives with regard to conservation within their own 
regions if the initiative is stricter than the EU initiatives. The national initiatives 
only apply to the fishermen in the Member States. A national conservation 
policy must therefore be in line with the EU conservation policy. 
 
The purpose of the EU conservation policy is to secure a rational use of the 
resources and to consider the interests of the fishing industry. The latter implies 
that the conservation policy must take into account, for example, economic   10 
conditions in fishery dependent regions. Before 31 January 2002 the Council of 
Ministers must agree on a new conservation policy. 
 
The main instrument in the conservation policy is quota setting. The TACs are 
fixed on a yearly basis, and the quotas are allocated to the Member States 
according to the principle of relative stability, which secure the Member States 
a constant share of the TAC. As mentioned in the introduction, the allocation 
scheme was decided in 1983, and has not been changed since. 
 
But which Member States participate in the fisheries in the North Sea? In order 
to highlight this some data from Anon (1999) on catches is presented. 
 
Figure 2: The Member States catches of cod in the North Sea, 1984-1999 
Source: Anon (1999) 
 
Figure 2 shows that most part of the cod in the North Sea are caught by vessels 
registered in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the United Kingdom vessels catch 
the same amount as the rest of the EU Member States. Danish fishermen make 
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2.2  Various TACs 
In this section the principles for the biological recommendations about the TAC 
are rewieved (section 2.2.1). Furthermore, a model for fixing the economic 
optimal TAC is outlined (section 2.2.2) and the objectives behind fixing the 
actual TAC are discussed (section 2.2.3). 
2.2.1 The recommended TAC 
For cod in the North Sea, ICES Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management 
(ACFM) recommends a TAC each year based on commercial catch data and 
vessel surveys. The TAC calculated by ACFM is a biological recommendation 
based on a precautionary approach, and reference points stated in terms of 
fishing mortality rates and spawning stock biomass are key concepts. Two 
kinds of reference points are calculated: 
 
-  Safe biological limits 
-  Precautionary reference points 
 
The concept of safe biological limits was first introduced in ACFM advice in 
1981 and was further developed in 1986. If a fish stock shall be within safe 
biological limits two conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, there must be a high 
probability that the spawning stock biomass is above the threshold where 
recruitment is impaired. Secondly, there must be a high probability that the 
fishing mortality rate is below the mortality rate that will drive the spawning 
stock biomass to the biomass threshold that must be avoided. The biological 
threshold can be called BLIM and the fishing mortality FLIM. Formally, FLIM is the 
fishing mortality that must be avoided with a high probability because of 
unknown  population dynamics, while B LIM is the spawning stock biomass 
below which the dynamics of the stock is unknown. In order to have a high 
probability of avoiding B LIM and F LIM, management actions must be taken 
before the reference points are reached. The precision with which the reference 
points are known and the risk, which is tolerable are important factors in 
determining the distance away from the reference points. Therefore, 
precautionary reference points BPA and FPA, are introduced. Formally, BPA is the 
spawning stock biomass below which management action should be taken 
according to the precautionary approach, and FPA is the precautionary reference   12 
point for fishing mortality. The precautionary reference points secure a high 
probability for avoiding F LIM and B LIM. In the yearly recommendations about 
the TAC, F PA and B PA act like constraints. Exceeding F PA indicates that over 
fishing takes place and the TAC is not consistent with the precautionary 
approach. If ACFM´s biological models show that the spawning stock is below 
BPA a rebuilding plan is also suggested. 
2.2.2 Bio-economic optimal TACs 
In order to compare the actual TACs with the bio-economic optimal TACs, a 
model from Arnason et al (2000) is used. A feedback rule, which is defined as 
an expression for what the optimal quota in the next period must be as a 
function of present variables, is used. The wish to find more realistical quotas 
has led many authors to recommend the use of feedback rules, see for example 
Clark and Munro (1978) and Conrad and Clark (1987). 
 
The theoretical model that is used is from Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a), 
(1997b), (1997c) and (1997d). What is new in this model is that in many cases, 
where it was considered impossible to calculate an optimal quota, it is possible 
in this model. In the model the optimal quota depends on the society’s time 
horizon. However, Arnason  et al (2000) assume an indefinite time horizon. 
Moreover, a case without discounting is analysed, since discounting only means 
small corrections in the optimal path, see for example Mendelsohn (1982) and 
Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a) and (1997c). 
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Where 
  y is catch 
  x is the fish stock 
  t is time 
  G(x) is the natural growth  
  p(.) is profit or resource rent 
 
A general formulation of the profit is: 
 
) x , y ( c y ) y ( p ) x , y ( - = p   (3) 
 
Where: 
  p(y) is the inverse demand function 
  c(x, y) is the cost function 
 
It is assumed that the profit function is quadratic in y. However, the profit 
function can be any arbitrary function of x. These assumptions means that the 
demand function must be approximated by a linear demand curve or that prices 
are constant. Moreover, the assumption means that the c ost function is 
maximally quadratic in y. Compared to the traditional models this is a less 
restrictive assumption, since non-constant prices and increasing marginal costs 
are allowed. A model with constant prices and marginal costs will recommend 
bang-bang control as an adjustment process towards equilibrium. The practical 
importance of this for fishery policy is limited. The model used here 
recommends a little fishing even if the actual stock is very much lower than the 
optimal stock. The magnitude of this depends on the society’s preferences with 
respect to time. If society has an indefinite time horizon, as assumed here, the 
fishermen will receive the largest possible profit, but an asymptotical 
adjustment towards equilibrium is received. 
 
Since both p (y) and c(y,x) are quadratic in y, (3) can be written as: 
 
2 y ) x ( K y ) x ( g ) x , y ( - = p   (4) 
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Where 
  g(x) are linear terms 
  K(x) are quadratic terms 
 
The optimal equilibrium is characterised by steady-state equilibrium and 
maximisation of the profit function. This equilibrium is called (x*, y*), where 
y* = G(x*). 
 
Now the sustainable yield is defined as: 
 
) x ), x ( G ( ) x ( S p =   (5) 
 
S(x) is the profit coupled to every possible stock, given biological equilibrium, 
and x* is the stock size that maximises S(x). 
 
To find the optimal TAC, y(x), it is necessary to consider how x* is reached. It 
can be shown that the optimal adjustment path, if the society has an indefinite 
time horizon, is given by
2: 
 
5 , 0 )) x ( K / )) x ( S *) x ( S (( / ) x ( G ) x ( y - - + =   (6) 
 
Arnason  et al (2000) use this model to calculate bio-economic optimal TACs 
for cod in the North Sea. In order to calculate the bio-economic optimal TACs 
it is necessary to have parameter estimates for the growth and profit functions. 
Various variants of the logistic growth function are estimated, and the function 




1 1 ( rx ) x ( G
2 - =   (7) 
 
With: 
  r = 0.53 
  C = 1218680 
 
 
                                                                 
2  For a proof of (6) see Sandal and Steinshamn (1997d).  
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Where: 
  r is the intrinsic growth rate 
  C is the carrying capacity 
 
Since the model also allows for non-constant prices, a linear demand function is 
also estimated. However, the slope of this demand function is insignificant, and 
so the analysis continues with a constant price of 10.4. Lastly, the following 




a ) x , y ( c
2
+ =   (8) 
 
With: 
  a = 481315. 05 
  b = 15.442 
 
With these parameter estimates it is possible to calculate the optimal catch. 
2.2.3 Actual TACs 
In article 4 of Regulation no. 3760/92 it is stated that: 
 
“Measures shall be drawn up in the light of available biological, 
socio-economic and technical analyses” 
 
This implies that scientific advice shall be incorporated, when decisions about 
the TAC are made. However, a problem with presenting scientific advice is the 
lack of specific management objectives. As seen above, both biological, socio-
economic and other t echnical (including bio-economic) considerations must be 
incorporated when the TAC is selected. However, both biologists and 
economists will agree that a well-defined management objective is necessary 
when advice is presented. Another problem is the way scientific advice is 
presented. Both politicians and administrators demand concise summaries on 
which to base their actions and indeed the advice presented by ACFM is easy to 
read. However, a problem with only reading concise summaries is that the 
administrators do not fully understand the assumptions on which the advice is 
based.   16 
The fishing industry often complains that it is subject to arbitrary decisions, 
which are based only upon scientific advice. However, according to Regulation 
no. 33760/92 each Member State can also use other arguments for fixing the 
TAC. Indeed, it was shown above that the objective is so vague that any 
argument can be used. Therefore, the fishing industry is in the position to argue 
for their wishes with respect to the TAC. It is therefore useful to make a 
comparison of the recommended TAC, the bio-economic optimal TAC, and the 
actual TAC to see what factors influence the actual TAC. 
 
2.3  A comparison for cod in the North Sea 
Before the comparison is presented it is useful to present ACFM estimates for 
the spawning stock.
3 This is done in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: The spawning stock for cod in the North Sea 
Source: Anon (1999) 
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Figure 3 reveals that the spawning stock decreased in the period 1982-1994. In 
the period 1995-1996 the stock started to recover, but in the period 1996 and 
onwards the spawning stock decreased again. In Anon (1999) it is estimated 
that BLIM = 70,000 tonnes, while BPA = 150,000 tonnes. Therefore, the stock is 
at present below the safe biological limit and has been below the precautionary 
reference point that secures a high probability for BLIM since 1983. Furthermore, 
Anon (1999) estimates that the number of recruiters in year 2000 will be small. 
For this reason ACFM recommends that catches for cod in the North Sea for 
year 2001 shall be at the lowest possible level and that a rebuilding plan is 
necessary in order to secure BPA. The rebuilding plan should include provisions 
to deter directed fishing, reduce by-catches of cod, and deter discarding and 
illegal landings. 
 
Now the recommended TACs, the bio-economic optimal TACs, and the actual 
TACs can be compared. This is done in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The recommended TAC (RTAC), the bio-economic optimal TAC 
(OC) and the actual TAC (TAC) 
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Figure 4 reveals that the actual TAC follows the recommended TAC reasonably 
closely. This indicates that biological principles such as safe biological limits 
and precautionary reference points play a major role when the TACs are 
determined. The first divergence occurs when the TACs was first legally 
established in 1982. The second divergence occurs in 1986, while the third 
divergence occurs in 2001. All these divergences arise because the fishing 
industry interests influence the political decisions on the TAC, and fishermen 
perceive higher catches to be in their interest. Above it was mentioned that the 
objective of the TAC policy could be interpreted in a way that bio-economic 
principles should be reflected in the TAC. As shown in Figure 4 this appears 
not to be the case. The bio-economic optimal TAC is much lower than the 
actual TAC. However, it could be argued that if the two curves follow each 
other, optimal TACs would be reflected in actual TACs. Such a conclusion is, 
however, not right. By the way optimal TACs is calculated, it is partly 
determined by actual stock size. But the actual TAC also reflects actual stock 
size. Therefore, the fact that there is a large discrepancy between bio-economic 
optimal TACs and actual TACs indicates that bio-economic principles are not 
reflected in the actual TAC. 
 
This conclusion may also be seen from the correlation coefficients, r, presented 
in Table 1. Apart from actual TACs, recommended TACs, and bio-economic 
optimal TACs, correlation coefficients have also been calculated for actual 
catches (CA) and the spawning stock (SS). Furthermore, t -statistics are 
calculated and the statistics are presented in parenthesis. It can be discussed 
whether the correlation coefficients should be calculated in total values or 
differences in values. Here it is chosen to do the calculations in total values, 
because it must be assumed that the fishermen react to totals. The disadvantage 
of calculating in totals is that the correlation coefficients are higher, because of 
a trend in the data set. Therefore, the interpretation must focus on small 
differences in the coefficients.  
  19 
Table 1:  Correlation coefficients 
  TAC  CA  SS  RTAC  OC 
TAC  --------------    0.85 
  (6.47) 
  0.93 
  (10.23) 
  0.96 
  (13.61) 
  0.79 
  (5.22) 
CA    0.85 
  (6.47) 
--------------    0.86 
  (6.81) 
  0.75 
  (4.58) 
  0.86 
  (6.63) 
SS    0.93 
  (10.23) 
  0.86 
  (6.81) 
--------------    0.85 
  (6.50) 
  0.88 
  (7.72) 
RTAC    0.96 
  (13.61) 
  0.75 
  (4.58) 
  0.85 
  (6.50) 
--------------    0.70 
  (3.94) 
OC    0.79 
  (5.22) 
  0.86 
  (6.63) 
  0.88 
  (7.72) 
  0.70 
  (3.94) 
 
 
All the correlation coefficients are high and significant. The correlation 
coefficients for actual catches against the other variables indicate what variables 
the fishermen respond to. Naturally, r is highest for actual TACs. Therefore, 
actual TACs govern the fishermen’s behaviour. However, the correlation 
coefficients for bio-economic optimal TAC are higher than the coefficients for 
recommended TAC. This can be seen as reflecting the fact that profits are 
included in the calculations of the bio-economic optimal TACs and that profit 
partly governs the behaviour of the fishermen. 
 
But what principles govern the actual TAC? It is seen that the actual TAC is 
highly correlated with the recommended TAC and the spawning stock. Since 
the spawning stock partly governs biological recommendations, this reflects the 
fact that biological recommendations play a major role when the actual TAC is 
fixed. By contrast, bio-economic principles are not reflected in the TAC. This 
may be criticised. Fishing cod in the North Sea is also an economic activity and 
actual fisheries management should also reflect the profits that can be achieved. 
Therefore, a bio-economic critique of the Danish fisheries management policy 
for cod in the North Sea is now given. 
 
3.  A bio-economic critique of the Danish ration policy 
The purpose of this section is to give a bio-economic critique of the Danish 
ration policy for cod in the North Sea by means of a theoretical analysis 
(section 3.3.). Before this is done a theoretical model must be outlined (section   20 
3.2.) and the Danish ration fishery for cod in the North Sea must be introduced 
(section 3.1.). 
 
3.1  Brief description of the Danish fishery regulation for cod in the 
North Sea 
As mentioned in the introduction it is the responsibility of the Member States to 
decide on how the quota is allocated to fishermen. The 1999 regulation is based 
on Regulation no. 802 of 11 November 1998, and this regulation is the basis for 
the description of the Danish regulation. Cod in the North Sea is managed as a 
ration fishery. First the quotas are distributed on time periods, and then a given 
amount of catch is determined as a function of vessel size measured in length, 
taking into account seasonal variations in the stock (see Tables 2 and 3). 
 
Table 2:  Allocation of cod quota on time periods, 1999 
Time period  North Sea 
% of total annual 
1 Jan-30 Apr  33 
1 May-31 Aug  33 
1 Sep-31 Dec  33 
 
Table 3:  Allocation of cod rations on vessel size, 
  May-June ration period, 1999 
Vessel size in Loa, metres  North Sea 
Tonnes 
  0-9    8.5 
  9-12    15.5 
12-16    26 
20-24    31.5 
24-    35 
 
A ration period is two months. The ration can be exceeded by 20%. The 
quantity by which the ration is exceeded is subtracted from the vessel ration in 
the next period. 
 
If the normal fisheries economic terms  are used, the ration fishery could be 
thought of as a variant of an individual non-transferable quota system. How- 
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ever, the ration fishery does not imply a property right to the fishermen, since 
part of the ration can be lost. 
 
In order to describe the Danish fishery for cod in the North Sea, some data from 
Anon (1997) are presented. 
 
Table 4:  Distribution of Danish fishing activity in the North Sea, 



















6  19  17  9  5  44 
Source: Calculations based on Anon (1997) 
 
Table 4 reveals that 6% of the Danish fishing day activity in the North Sea is 
allocated to fishing cod alone. However, in total 34 % of the Danish fishing day 
activity is in some way related to cod. 
 
With respect to the Danish fishery in general, Table 5 reveals which vessels 
mostly catch cod. 
 
Table 5:  Danish catch of cod per vessel, 1997, Tonnes per Vessel 
Trawlers 
under 50 GT 
Trawlers 
between 50 
and 199 GT 
Trawlers 




under 20 GT 
Netters over 
20 GT 
67.5  82.7  14.8  50.9  34.9  105.9 
Source: Anon (1997) 
 
From Table 5 it is seen that Netters under 20 GT and Trawlers between 50 and 
199 GT catch most cod per vessel. An average n umber of cod per vessel is 
caught by Trawlers under 50 GT and Danish Seiners. Trawlers over 200 GT do 
not catch much cod per vessel. 
 
Table 6 reveals the current operating profit in relation to the costs by fishing 
cod in Denmark. 
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Table 6:  Current operating profit in relation to the costs by fishing cod 














27.7  27.6  39.2  23.2  33.2  24.2 
Source: Anon (1997) 
 
It is seen that fishing the flatfish is the most profitable part of the Danish 
fishery. Of the cod fisheries, the mixed fisheries and fishing cod alone yields 
approximately the same profit. 
 
3.2  A management model 
The purpose of this section is to introduce a m anagement model that can be 
used to evaluate the Danish ration policy. The simplest model that will yield 
consistent predictions is selected from Clark (1990). However, note that the 
results of the analysis generalise to more advanced models, see for example 
Clark (1980). A model with one species is adopted.
4 Furthermore, it is assumed 
that one variable can represent the development in the biomass,
5 and uncertainty 
is disregarded.
6 Also, fixed costs are assumed away
7 and the price is assumed to 
be exogenously given.
8 Lastly, the growth function is assumed to be well 
behaved
9 and the work is done within continuous time.
10 
 
                                                                 
4  See for example Garrod (1973), Mercer (1982), Pauly and Murphy (1982) and May (1984) for 
a discussion of economic multi-species models. Early biological multi-species models include 
Andersen and Ursin (1975) and Andersen et al (1973). 
5  See for example Beverton and Holt (1957), Turvey (1964), Clark  et al (1973), Hanneson 
(1975), Waugh and Calvo (1974), Beddington and Taylor (1973), Botsfod (1981) and Getz 
(1988) for a discussion of vintage models. 
6  Andersen and Sutinen (1984) give an overview of stochastic bio-economics. 
7  A bioeconomic model with investments is to be found in Clark et al (1979). 
8  See Anderson (1973) and Copes (1972) for a discussion of traditional demand curves in fishery 
economics. 
9  See for example Hirch and Small (1974) for a discussion of Allee-effects. 
10  Discrete time models are to be found in Mann (1970), Ploude (1971), Spence and Starrett 
(1975) and Levhari et al (1981).  
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In section 3.2.1 fishermen behaviour is discussed, while the bionomic
11 
equilibrium is outlined in section 3.2.2. A discussion of bio-economic optimal 
exploitation is presented in section 3.2.3. 
3.2.1 Fishermen behaviour 
Assume that n vessels exist and call Ei effort for vessel i. The following short-
run production function is introduced: 
 
i i E ) x ( q y =   (9) 
 
Where: 
  x is the stock size 
  yi is the catch of vessel i 
  q(x)/x is the catchability and q(x)/x = a constant corresponding to a 
Schaefer-model. Here it is assumed that q´(x) > 0 (the catchability 
increases with the stock size) 
 
The cost function for effort for vessel i is ci(Ei). The assumptions regarding the 
cost function are introduced in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: The marginal and average cost functions for fisherman i 
                                                                 
11  The bionomic equilibrium is characterized by biological equilibrium and an effort level, where 
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At the point E ri average costs equal marginal costs, and k i is the value of the 
cost function at this point. 
 
Now the individual profit functions can be introduced. The profit function for 
fishermen i is: 
 
) E ( c E ) x ( pq ) E , x ( i i i i i - = p   (10) 
 
where p is a constant price. The individual fisherman selects E i in order to 
maximise the profit. This corresponds to perfect competition (every individual 
fisherman ignores the effect on the fish stock). 
 














k ) x ( pq for    0 E
k pq(x) for    ) x ( pq
E
c
  (11) 
 
(11) indicates that the marginal revenue is set equal to marginal costs. Note that 
the effort will be larger than or equal to Eri if the individual fisherman selects a 
positive effort. 
 
From the first-order condition, effort as a function of stock size can be obtained: 
 
) x ( E E i i =   (12) 
 
With the assumptions that q´(x) > 0 and Ei > Eri, it will be the case that Ei´(x) > 
0. In other words, effort is increasing with stock size. 
 
The fishermen leaves the industry if pq(x) < k i. This can be used to obtain a 
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where x i is an individual reservation stock. Now it is useful to list fishermen 
with increasing ki: 
 
n 2 1 k ......... k k £ £ £   (14) 
 
Fishermen with a low ki can be considered as being more efficient, and they can 
fish profitably at a lower x. This leads to the conclusion that fishermen also can 
be listed after their reservation stocks: 
 
n 2 1 x ......... x x £ £ £   (15) 
 
Now a characterisation of the bionomic equilibrium is required. 
3.2.2 Bionomic equilibrium 
The total effort is given as E = ￿Ei,
12 and the total catch, y, is: 
 
E ) x ( q y=   (16) 
 
The bionomic equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: The bionomic equilibrium 
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In Figure 6, G(x) is the natural growth rate. Since the interest is in finding a 
bionomic equilibrium a curve that reflects optimal catches must be drawn and 
this curve is E(x)q(x). In L´ the marginal fishermen, j, have a reservation stock 
of x´. Because total revenue equals total costs for the marginal vessel, L´ in 
Figure 6 can be expressed as: 
 







) E ( c
´) x ( pq =   (18) 
 
Therefore, the marginal revenue equals average costs for the marginal vessel in 
the bionomic equilibrium, and the marginal vessel operates at a zero-profit 
point, where Ej = Erj. The infra-marginal vessel operates with profit and equals 
marginal revenue and marginal costs. In a simple fishery economic model it is 
assumed that vessels are homogeneous, and the resource rent is dissipated 
because of open access without regulation. Here the resource rent is not 
dissipated for infra-marginal vessels because vessels are heterogeneous. 
 
To conclude, the bionomic equilibrium is characterised by: 
 
´) x ( E ´) x ( q ´) x ( G =   (19) 
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= =   (21) 
3.2.3 Bio-economic optimal exploitation 
Here a central authority (society), that can control the effort  of all vessels, is 
imagined. Society maximises the present value of future resource rents in 
indefinite time. If t is the time, the maximisation problem is:  
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  (23) 
 
where r is the discount rate. 
 
Optimal control theory is used to solve this problem and expressing the 
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The maximum principle implies that: 
 
) x ( q ) p (
E
) E ( c
i
i i m - =
d
d
  (25) 
 
mq(x) is the user cost of the fish stock, and in optimum the value of the 
marginal revenue equals the marginal social cost including the user cost. 
 
From the adjoint equation it is obtained that: 
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  (26) 
 
The equilibrium solution is characterised by the following conditions: 
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+   (31) 
 
(31) is a modified version of the normal golden rule for exploitation of 
renewable resources and can be given a capital theoretical interpretation.
13 G´(x) 
is the marginal productivity of the fish stock, and k jq´(x)G(x)/q(x)
2(p – k j/q(x)) 
is the marginal stock effect. In optimum the sum of these two terms must equal 
the interest rent. 
 
The optimum can be illustrated as in Figure 7. 
                                                                 
13  See Clark (1990) for an extensive treatment of a fishery with a capital theoretical approach and 
an interpretation of (31).  
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Figure 7: The optimum 
 
Following (29), the bio-economic optimal equilibrium is where all fishermen 
operate at the same marginal costs equal to (p  -  m)q(x). Under open access 
without regulation all vessels operate at the same marginal costs equal to pq(x). 
 
The bio-economic optimal equilibrium (x*, E*, j*; Ei*) may be compared with 
the bionomic equilibrium. It will be the case that: 
 
* x ´ x <   (32) 
 
* E E >   (33) 
 
* j j>   (34) 
 
* E E i i >   (35) 
 
That individual effort is larger in the bionomic equilibrium can be explained by 
the fact that effort in this equilibrium does not incorporate the user cost of the 
fish stock. (34) is holding because entry in the bionomic equilibrium continues 
until the average cost is equal to the marginal revenue. Because there are more 
E1 
DKK 
E1  Ej  Ej  E  E 
MC1  MCj  ￿MCi 
DKK 
DKK 
(p - m) 
q(x)   30 
vessels and individual effort is larger in the bionomic equilibrium, total effort 
will also be larger and stock size smaller. 
 
This model can be used to predict the effect of various management systems. In 
section 3.1. the Danish regulation of cod in the North Sea was described as a 
ration fishery. What effect will the model predict for such a management 
regime? 
 
3.3  A bio-economic critique of ration management 
Firstly, note that the possibility of exceeding the quota by 20% will increase the 
fishermen’s possibility to make adjustments. Therefore, the effect of the 20% 
rule is to increase the efficiency in the fishing fleet. However, for the purpose of 
analysing the ration fishery, it is useful to disregard the possibility of exceeding 
the ration. 
 
In order to predict the effects of a ration fishery, two ration periods, 1 and 2, are 
for simplicity considered. Let y 1i and  y2i denote catches for fisherman i in 
period 1 and 2, and denote E 1i  and E 2i the effort for fisherman i in the two 
periods. Denote the ration in period 1 Q i1 and the ration in period 2 Q 2i and 
assume that Q 1i < Q 2i. Furthermore, assume that the catchability is identical in 
both periods.
14 Since y ti = q(x)Eti, the ration restriction corresponds to q(x)Eti < 
Qti, where t denote time periods and t = 1,2. Furthermore, assume that the 
number of fishermen is large so that each fisherman ignores the effect of the 
resource restriction (perfect competition). With this notation fisherman i 
maximises: 
 




i 1 i 1 Q E ) x ( q £   (37) 
 
  i 2 i 2 Q E ) x ( q £   (38) 
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Because catchability is identical in the two periods and Q2i > Q1i, there are three 
possibilities. This can be analysed using Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Assume first 





) E ( c
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d
d
= l -     for t = 1,2  (39) 
 
where  lti is a Lagrange-multiplier for period t for fisherman i. Optimality 
requires that  m = l1i = l2i = l1j = l2j for all j „ i. In other words, the shadow 
prices must be identical between vessels and periods and equal to the user cost 
of the fish stock as derived in section 3.2.3. The reason for this is that if the 
shadow price is greater in period 2 than in period 1, the profit can be increased 
by letting the fisherman catch more in period 2 and less in period 1 The 
information requirements of this system are enormous, and as the ration fishery 
currently is managed in Denmark, bio-economic optimality will certainly not be 
reached, since the allocation schemes are based on other objectives such as 
distribution. This point is explored further below. 
 
Assume next that the ration restriction in periods 1 and 2 is non-binding. In this 





) E ( c
) x ( pq
d
d
=     for t = 1,2  (40) 
 
This corresponds to the open access condition without regulation, and therefore 
rations have no effect on the effort. There is still too much effort as under open 
access without regulation. This result is by no means surprising, because none 
of the restrictions are binding. 
 
Because Q 2i > Q 1i a possibility is also that (37) is binding, while (38) is non-
binding. Now (39) holds for period 1 and (40) for period 2 and optimality 
requires that  l1i = l1j = m for j „ i. As in the case where both restrictions is 
binding the information requirements of this system, is enormous and in 
addition to this an open access problem without regulation arises for period 2. 
                                                                 
14  The assumptions about identical catchability are selected, since the main point with the analysis 
of ration fishery can be captured with this assumptions.   32 
For cod in the Baltic Sea a special rule is that if catches is less than 80% of the 
ration in one period, next periods rations will be reduced to the catches in the 
previous period. In order to analyse this rule let Qi1 denote period 1´s ration and 
Qi2 period 2´s ration and assume that Qi1 > Qi2. Part of the ration restriction for 
period 2 can now be formulated as q(x)Ei1  > q(x)Ei2 if q(x)Ei1  < 0.8Qi1. 
Furthermore, assume that the ration restriction is non-binding in period 1 and 
that q(x)Ei1 < 0.8Qi1. Now the first-order condition for period 1 is (p + li2)(q(x)) 
=  dCi1(Ei1)/dEi1. This condition shows that the fisherman faces an opportunity 
cost for fishing less than 80% of the ration in period 1. This cost is value of the 
loss of fishing opportunity in period 2. Furthermore, the 80% rule creates an 
interaction between time periods and thereby raises the information 
requirements. 
 
A further critique concerns the allocation scheme in Tables 2 and 3. A brief 
glance at the scheme reveals that they are based on objectives such as 
distribution. In theory the optimal allocation of rations secures that the marginal 
profit (resource rent) is equal between vessels and periods (see (39)). The 
information requirements of such an allocation scheme are enormous, so a 
proxy must be found. A very rough proxy based on available information is that 
a group of vessels share of the quota is its share of the total rent in the fishing 
industry. Formally, if there are three groups of vessels (1, 2 and 3), the share of 
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  TR1: The total revenue for group 1. 
 
  VC1: The variable costs for group 1. 
 
  TR1- VC1: Group 1 rent 
 
  ￿(TR i - VCi): The total rent for all groups  
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In order to highlight the ineffiency of the e xisting ration system, such 
calculations have been done for cod. The results are summarized in Table 7.
15 
 


















13  28  18  10  11  109 
 
The calculations are based on an assumption that the vessels within the 
categories are homogeneous. Compared to Table 3 the figures reveal that the 
large vessels receive too small a share of the total quota. Therefore the adopted 
allocation scheme is not bio-economic optimal. 
 
As a result of the analysis in this section it follows that the ration system is 
expected to perform poorly. It is therefore important to suggest alternative 
management regimes. To study these alternatives the management model from 
section 3.2. will be used. 
 
4.  Bio-economic alternatives to the fishery policy 
What will be an optimal policy? At the EU level bio-economic optimal TACs 
can be calculated using a feedback rule. These can be distributed to Member 
States in an optimal fashion.
16 Therefore an alternative to the Danish ration 
policy must be found. In this section attention is turned to two bio-economic 
orientated regulatory approaches that will secure an optimum: 
 
-  Taxes (section 4.1.) 
-  ITQs (section 4.2.) 
 
It is important to state that ITQs and taxes must be used in all countries fishing 
in the North Sea. Therefore, the selected regulatory approach must also be used 
in other Member States in the EU. 
 
                                                                 
15  Appendix 2 gives the details of the calculations. 
16  For example, through a system of individual transferable quotas (ITQs).   34 
4.1  Taxes 
Identification of a shadow price in situations with externalities is a well-known 
principle in welfare economics. Let the analysed period be a year. From (25) the 
optimality condition is: 
 
) x ( q ) p (
E
) E ( c
i
i i m - =
d
d
  (42) 
 
A tax per unit of fish caught of  m =  t will get an otherwise unregulated 
fishermen to act optimally. This can be seen in the following way. With the tax 
the individual fisherman’s maximisation problem is: 
 
) E ( c E ) x ( q ) p ( ) E , x ( i i i i i - t - = p   (43) 
 
The first-order condition is: 
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E
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  (44) 
 
and with  t =  m a first-best optimum is reached. Therefore, a tax per unit of 
caught fish can result in a first-best optimum. 
 
A problem with taxes is that the fishermen will be opposed to them. As under 
open access without regulation the fishermen get a resource rent of zero or at 
least only infra-marginal rents. The resource rent goes to society. However, 
including a restriction in the maximisation problem may solve this problem. 
This restriction could be formulated as a minimum resource rent to the 
fishermen. Another problem arises with regard to the calculation of the optimal 
tax. The calculation poses big information requirements (for example the cost 
structure of every vessel must be known). However, w ith a principal-agent 
analysis it is possible to include these information problems in the calculation 
of taxes. Furthermore, a problem that has been mentioned with taxes is that it is 
necessary with constant adjustment of the tax rate. However, because the 
analysed period is a year this problem is by no mean higher than with 
adjustments of ITQs. The last problem that can be mentioned with taxes is that  
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there can be large administrative cost associated with this management 
approach. 
 
4.2  ITQs 
Another economically orientated management regime is ITQs. In the EU a 
system of ITQs is used in the Netherlands, and in a modified way in the United 
Kingdom. A basic principle within welfare economics is that transferable 
permits and taxes are equivalent as means of correcting externalities in terms of 
efficiency. 
 
Now the management model is used to show this result. Assume that the quota 
allows fishermen i to catch with a rate Q i. Therefore, every fisherman’s 
maximisation problem is: 
 




i i i Q E ) x ( q y £ =   (46) 
 
This can be written as: 
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i i Q y £   (48) 
 
Every fisherman can buy and sell quota units. Given the fisherman’s existing 
quota is Q i, under what conditions will the fisherman choose to buy an extra 
quota unit? Assume that a competitive market for trade with quotas exists and 
that the price on this market is m per unit. 
 
The benefit associated with a marginal quota unit is the marginal increase in the 
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The fisherman will buy more quotas when  dqi(x, y i)/dQi > m, and sell quotas 
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(51) can be written as: 
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It is obvious that every fisherman will only be satisfied with a quota if it is fully 
utilised. Therefore, y i  = Q i  and E i = y i/q(x) = Q i/q(x). (52) can therefore be 
written as: 
 
) x ( q ) m p (
E
) E ( c
i
i i - =
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d
  (53) 
 
This equation can be understood in an alternative way. When the fisherman 
chooses to catch y i = Qi, an opportunity costs arises, since the quota could have 
been sold. 
 
In order to complete the ITQ model it must be shown how m is fixed. Let Q = 
￿Qi, be the total quota allocated to fishermen. The total demand, if the price is 
m, is D(x, m) = ￿Di(x, m). The quota price is determined by supply equal to 
demand:  
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Q ) m , x ( Q =   (54) 
 
It follows that society can  control m by choosing Q. It is therefore seen that 
taxes and ITQs are equivalent. By choosing Q such that m =  m, a first-best 
optimum is reached. 
 
However, there are also problems associated with an ITQ system. Extensive 
control programs must often follow  ITQ systems. Furthermore, transferable 
permits assume a perfect function of markets; see for example Dasquapta et al 
(1982). 
 
Even though taxes and ITQs are equivalent in terms of efficiency, their 
distributional implications are different. In the case of taxes the resource rent 
goes to the society, while the resource rent goes to the original quota owner in 
the case of ITQs. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper the EU TAC policy for cod in the North Sea has been discussed. 
The actual TACs have been compared with the  biological recommendations 
about the TACs, and the bio-economic optimal TACs. It was shown that the 
biological recommendations and the actual TACs follow each other closely. 
Therefore, biological principles govern the actual TAC. However, the 
comparison of the actual TACs and bio-economic optimal TACs shows that 
bio-economic principles are poorly reflected in the TAC. However, fishing is an 
economic activity and the actual TAC should reflect the economic optimal TAC 
to a greater degree. 
 
A bio-economic critique of the Danish management system for cod in the North 
Sea is given. Denmark uses rations to manage the cod fishery in the North Sea, 
and by means of a theoretical analysis it is shown that the information 
requirements for securing an optimum is very large. Furthermore, the actual 
allocation scheme of rations distributes too large a part of the quota to small 
vessels. 
 
Alternatives to the ration regime have also been briefly studied and taxes and 
ITQ systems are recommended, combined with bio-economic optimal TACs. It   38 
is important to note that all Member States fishing cod in the North Sea must 
adopt the same management regime. It is therefore possible that taxes or ITQs 
must be used at the EU level in order to secure optimality. For this reason, 
Jensen and Vestergaard (1999) study a EU tax on effort. 
 
The calculation of the bio-economic optimal TACs is based on a single-species 
assumption. However, the figures in the text show that the cod fishery in the 
North Sea is a multi-species fishery. The calculation of bio-economic optimal 
TACs using a multi-species assumption is a promising area for future research. 
Another promising research area is to include uncertainty about the stock size in 
the calculations of the bio-economic optimal TAC. The calculations of the bio-
economic optimal TAC in this paper were done using a deterministic model, 
but the stock estimates by Anon (1999) are not exact.  
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Appendix 1: The data 
Table A: The data series 












1982    260600    303251    190267    210000    840297    208000 
1983    246670    259287    155113    240000    649374    129000 
1984    222920    228286    133669    220000    718477    154000 
1985    252770    214629    126553    245000    503183    90000 
1986    185220    204053    114619    145000    683575    142000 
1987    179100    216213    105190    175000    571797    101000 
1988    168390    184240    100389    165000    426804    49000 
1989    135650    139936    91308    135000    417331    46000 
1990    115850    125314    78553    110000    329129    36000 
1991    105945    102478    61659    100000    297724    7000 
1992    104345    114020    69786    100000    410010    43000 
1993    104345    121749    66227    100000    349938    23000 
1994    106165    110634    67972    105000    478719    67000 
1995    127950    138523    80981    125000    490099    72000 
1996    141370    126423    104369    140000    438419    53000 
1997    115000    124000    82000    135000    503000    90000 
1998    140000    146000    74000    153000    321000    36000 
1999    132400    96000    66000    125000    290000    7000 
2000    81000      67000    79000    299000    7000 
2001    40000        0     
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Appendix 2: Profit calculations 
B: Profit Table calculations, 1998 















over 20 GT 
A. Gross 
output for cod 
1000kr/firm 
553.5  950  267.4  1241.7  587.8  1949 
B. Gross 
output in total 
1000kr/firm 
1552.2  4187.8  11077.7  2529.8  880.2  2494.5 
C. Share of 
cod 
0.36  0.23  0.02  0.49  0.67  0.78 
D. Total costs 
1000kr/firm 
1138  3602.7  8757.6  1920.5  618.7  1959.4 
E. Total costs 
of hired labour. 
1000kr/firm 
390.9  1334.4  3132.2  830.2  204.1  868.3 
F.Depreciation  185.2  615.3  1551.9  232.7  128.2  324 
G. Labour 
input of crew. 
Days at sea 




Days at sea 
163.9  147.3  147  166.7  150.3  194.1 
I. Wage per 
day 
2.18  2.53  3.41  4.22  1.88  1.61 
J. Labour cost 
of fishermen 
357.92  372.6  501.96  703.94  282.21  311.59 
K. Variable 
costs 
1310  3360  7707.66  2391.74  772.7  1635 
L. Variable 
costs of cod 
471.89  772.80  154.15  1172  517.72  1276 
M. Vessel 
profit 
81.61  177.20  113.25  69.75  70.10  673 
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Table B: Continued 















over 20 GT 
N. Number 
of vessels 
422  114  122  94  396  74 
O. Total  
profit to the 
group 
34400  20200  13816  6567  27759  49831 
P. Share of 
total profit 









13  28  18  10  11  109 
 
C is calculated as A/B, while I is E/G. J = I*H, K = J + D - F, L = K* C, M = A 
– L, O = N*M. P is O divided by the total profit. The Danish quota for cod in 
the North Sea is 24520 tonnes for 1999. Q = P *24520, and R = Q/N. 
 
Using a register for decommissioned vessels it is possible to transform the 
categories in GT to categories in metres. The register covers decommissioned 
vessels in 1987-93. However, a problem is that the vessels decommissioned can 
be different from the vessels that are not decommissioned. On basis of the 
register the following equations have been estimated: 
 
85 . 0 R length  * 652 . 2 433 . 14 GT   metres   12   Below
2 = + - =  
90 . 0 R length  * 7.57     -78.888 GT   metres   24   and   12   Between
2 = + =  
69 . 0 R length  * 13.27   -219.198 GT   metres   24 Over 
2 = + =  
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Now the categories from table A can be inserted in the relevant equations. This 
yields the categories in the text. 
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